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A  Note  on High Discount  Rates  and Depletion
of Primary Forests
Erwin Bulte  and Daan van Soest
Conventional  wisdom  implies that high discount rates  accelerate  depletion of tropical
forests.  As  shown in  this  article,  this  result does not  necessarily  hold in a  two-state
variable  model  that  distinguishes  between  primary  and  secondary  forest  stocks.  In
the  context  of a fixed  concession  period and  imperfect  government  control,  logging
of primary  forests may be both accelerated  and depressed  as discount rates  increase.
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Introduction
Conventional  wisdom  implies  that  high  discount rates  discourage  sustainable  forestry.
High  discount  rates  typically  accelerate  harvesting,  depress  investments  in  sustainable
resource  management,  and reduce the weight attached  to the needs  and desires of distant
future  generations.  In  the economic  literature,  the  process  of discounting  has  been  la-
belled  ethically  indefensible  (Ramsey),  a  polite  expression for rapacity  (Harrod),  and is
believed  by some  to  advance  doomsday  (Koopmans).  At first  sight, the  higher the dis-
count  rate  the  amore  pronounced  the  negative  impact  on  intergenerational  equity  and
sustainability.  Since  it has  been  argued by many  that current  deforestation  is excessive
and  socially  wasteful  (e.g.,  Barbier  et  al.;  Brown  and  Pearce),  and  since  intertemporal
harvesting  paths  are  for an important part driven by discount  rates (Hotelling;  Dasgupta
and Heal), a logical  conclusion  would be that the timber industry applies a discount rate
that  is too high.1
However,  the  adverse  effects  of high  discount rates  on  intergenerational  equity  and
sustainability  is not  generally  valid  in  resource  economics.  Farzin  demonstrated  that  if
the backstop price of a resource is a function of the interest rate or if production is capital
intensive,  the  depletion  period of  a  mine  may  increase  or decrease  as  the  interest  rate
shifts.  With respect  to  forestry,  Price  argued  that if discount rates  are  lowered,  the op-
portunity  costs  of investment  funds  are also reduced,  thereby  making forest exploitation
more  profitable.  Hence,  lower  discount  rates  may  enhance  the  case  for  short-term  ex-
ploitation  of forests.
In  this  study  we  obtain  similar  results  for  tropical  forestry  without  making  any  as-
sumptions  about the  capital  requirements  of substitutes  and  without  exploring  the con-
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sequences  of changes  in the  discount rate  on the opportunity  costs  of investment funds.
Instead,  we analyze  the influence of the discount rate on the way in which tropical forests
are  converted  into  agricultural  land.  It is  explicitly recognized  that primary  forests  are
converted into secondary  forests by the timber  industry and we  model the interlinkages
in  a  simple  two-state  variable  model.  An important  assumption  in this  study  is that the
government  (as the  owner  of the  forest)  has  imperfect  control  over the  harvesting  de-
cisions of the logging firm that is granted a concession for harvesting,  such that the firm
has a  certain freedom  to allocate  its intertemporal  supply. The model  is solved numeri-
cally to highlight the impact of discount rates on the  t  esdepletion period of mature primary
forest.
A  Two-State  Variable  Model
Many  governments  in developing  countries  consider their forest base to be  suboptimally
large  (Myers)  and  develop  forest zonage  plans  in  which part  of the  forest area  is des-
ignated as conversion forests. Conversion forests are destined to be cleared for alternative
uses,  such  as  agricultural  cultivation  (see,  for example,  the  case  of Cameroon,  as  de-
scribed in Cote). Land can be cleared from its forest cover by clearcutting the entire area
as quickly  as possible, or it can  be transformed  gradually  such that the net present value
of land use  is  maximized.  Of course there  are  situations  in  which  instantaneous  clear-
cutting  maximizes  net  present  value  of land,  but  this  is  certainly  not  generally  true.
During a gradual  conversion phase  two types  of forests  can be  discerned. The first type
is untouched  forests,  generally  referred  to as  primary  forests. Trees  have  matured fully
and  the  timber  extracted  from these  forests  can  be  sold  at high  prices  in  international
markets.  Primary forests  have no net  growth:  they  are  in ecological  equilibrium  where
growth  equals  decay.  By  definition,  primary  forests  are  turned  into secondary  forests,
the  second  type,  if they  are  selectively  logged  (for example,  Kummar  and  Sham).  In
contrast to primary forests, secondary forests display net growth because half-grown trees
are  exposed to  more sunlight  and face less competition  for other  scarce resources.2
Suppose  that  the  government  owns  an  area  of primary  forest  x,(O).  If the  benefits
accruing  to  society  from  sustainable  forestry  are  less  than  the  benefits  associated  with
alternative  land  use  (for  instance,  agriculture),  then eventually  the forest  cover will be
cleared.  The government  will  solve the following problem:
rT  r°
(1)  max  U =  (t)e -t  dt +  e-8T  J  A(T)e-8(  dT,
subject  to  appropriate  state  equations,  nonnegativity  constraints,  and the  constraint  that
cumulative  extraction from 0  to T equals  the total primary forest stock at t  = 0,  which
is xl(O).  In (1),  B(t) are  (social)  benefits  derived  from timber  exploitation  and A(t)  are
(social)  benefits  from the  alternative  land use  option.3 Finally,  8 is the  opportunity  cost
of capital, used by the  government  as  discount rate.  Solving the  government's  problem
2 Additional differences  between  primary and secondary  forests,  not elaborated further upon in  this article,  are differences
in accessibility  for shifting cultivators (Myers)  and differences  in preservation  values.
3 We can  assume that the government  solves  for a harvest plan that is socially optimal.  Alternatively  and without loss,  we
can assume  that the government  maximizes,  for example,  a political  preference  function (e.g.,  Becker).
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yields  (a) an optimal  intertemporal extraction path for the forest stock and (b) the optimal
period  T in which  all forest  cover  is  cleared.4
Tropical  commercial  logging typically involves  a contract between the government,  as
the  owner  of the  resource,  and  a pivate  firm.  The  fifirm  is  granted  the right  to harvest
and  manage  a  certain parcel  of forest  for a specific  period of time.  We  assume  that the
government  aims to achieve  optimal  deforestation  as  determined by the optimality  con-
ditions  that follow from the government's  problem  by setting  the terms of a concession
contract  with a  logging  firm.  However,  limited  ability  of governments  in tropical coun-
tries  to  enforce  concession contracts  is well  documented  (for example,  Grut, Gray,  and
Egli). An alternative interpretation  is that the transaction or enforcement costs associated
with  enforcing  full compliance  exceed  the  benefits  of compliance.  For  that reason  we
assume  that  the  government  is  able  to  set  the  optimal  "depletion  time"  of the  forest
stock  T,  but due  to  limited  capability  of the  government  to  monitor  the  firm's  logging
activities  or output,  the harvesting  decisions  of the firm cannot  be fully controlled.5 The
consequence is that the firm has a certain freedom to allocate intertemporal  supply, which
will  result in  an  intertemporal  harvesting  path that  is  optimal for the  firm  (conditional
on the predetermined  depletion time  ) but not necessarily  for the government.  Discrep-
ancies  arise  if,  for instance,  harvesting  involves  external  effects  or if the  firm applies  a
different discount rate than the government.  In the remaining part of this article we focus
exclusively on the latter.
In a simple model, the discount rate of a private firm may be based on the opportunity
cost of capital  (8)  and  a possible risk premium (o). In the case of the timber industry  in
tropical countries,  the latter may be a function of the security  of its tenure rights (Deacon;
Mendelsohn).  We assume  that  the timber industry perceives  a constant  probability  K  of
losing  its tenure  rights  due  to  hostile government  policy.  When  ao =  -ln(l - K),  then
e-M  is the probability  of having  control  over the  stock at time  t.  We define  ao +  6  = r.
Due to this  risk premium the government  and firm will prefer different extraction paths,
even if they have  the same  opportunity  cost of capital.
Now the firm's optimization  problem can be sketched.  The firm has agreed to deforest
an area of mature, nongrowing primary forest (xl(O))  in T years.  Suppose that it is optimal
for the firm to log  the primary forest  selectively  such that trees with small diameters are
allowed  to grow and reach  commercially  (more) profitable  stem  sizes.  Selective logging
turns  the  primary forest  into  a  forest  with  net  growth.  The  firm's problem  consists  of
two  linked  subproblems:  (a) with  respect  to  the  primary  stock,  an  optimal  extraction
path and  depletion time  (denoted by  Ti)  must be solved for;  and  (b) with respect  to the
stock  of secondary  forest,  an optimal  extraction path  and  starting time  (denoted by  T 2)
must  be solved  for.  Due to  the  set-up of the model,  and more  specifically  the transver-
sality condition  that every  hectare must  be cleared  from its  (secondary)  forest cover  at
T,  the firm's  subproblem  is concerned  with finding  the starting  time that maximizes  net
present  value  of exploitation,  rather  than  the  optimal  depletion  time.  Of course  it  is
possible  to harvest primary forest  and  secondary  forest  at the same time (though not on
4 User  cost  and  its  development  over  time  is  an  important  determinant  of the optimal  timing of switching  to  alternative
land  use.  We  refer  to  McConnell,  Daberkow,  and Hardie  for  a  model that  determines  (approximately)  optimal  harvesting
when  timber production  eventually  ends.  Since  we  are  interested  in optimal  management  of the  firm  (which faces  a given
T) rather than the government,  we  do  not deal  explicitly  with the complexities  of  solving the government's  problem.
5 Hence  the timber  industry is  not  allowed to harvest  after T and is  not allowed to stop harvesting  before T. A reason for
the latter may be that the government  wants to get a steady stream of revenues from forest exploitation. Because of imperfect
monitoring,  the  government can  only enforce  that a positive harvest  takes place in each  period.
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the  same  hectare,  obviously),  as  T 1 can be  arbitrarily  near T  and  T,  can  be  arbitrarily
near  zero.
Formally,  the objective  function  of the  firm is specified as  follows:
fT
(2)  max P  =  [Pl(t)y 1(t)  + P2(t)y2(t)]e-e - dt,
Y1,Y2  J
where H  indicates the  present  value  of the profit  stream,  T is  the concession  period  as
determined  by the  government,  yi(t),  i  =  1, 2  indicates  harvesting  in  primary  and  sec-
ondary forest in period  t, respectively,  and  P,(t) represents  the (net) price  of wood from
forest  type  i  in  period  t.  Because  of the  differences  between  primary  and  secondary
forests  (in tree quality and in growth),  the rate of harvesting in primary forest (yl(t)) and
the rate of harvesting  in  secondary  forests  (y2(t))  are  expressed  in different dimensions.
Harvesting  in primary  forests  is measured  in hectares logged,  whereas  harvesting of the
growing  secondary  forest  is  expressed  in  cubic  meters  of  wood.  As will become  clear
below,  this  makes  more sense  in the context  of the  equation of motion for the stock  of
secondary  forest.
Most  probably  (that is,  unless tenure  rights  are  defined  for an extremely  long period
and the  discount rate  applied  by the firm is extremely  low or negative),  there will be  a
difference  in  stem  size  between  wood harvested  in  primary  and  secondary  forests.  In
our model,  this  difference  in  quality of wood  extracted  is reflected  by the fact  that the
harvests  from  primary  and  secondary  forests  are  sold  for different  prices  at different
markets.  Furthermore,  prices  are assumed to be net of extraction costs, and revenues  are
net revenues.  If marginal  extraction costs  are  constant,  this  assumption  is harmless,  but
even with marginal  extraction costs that  are not constant, the qualitative  results are gen-
erally  not  affected.  However,  there  is  one  aspect  of ignoring  extraction  costs  that  is
potentially restrictive:  if there are  significant economies  of scale in harvesting,  it may be
more  attractive  for  firms  to clearcut  the entire  tree cover and  save  on exploitation costs
than  to harvest  selectively  and  benefit  from forest growth  for future  harvesting.  In the
remainder  of this article  we  assume  that possible economies  of scale in exploitation  are
outweighed by the benefits  from harvesting  additional  forest  growth  after selective  log-
ging,  such  that  selective  logging  is  optimal  for the  firm.  If  scale  economies  dominate
growth  benefits  and  we  maintain  the  condition  that  output  should  be  strictly  positive
from 0 to  T,  interior solutions  for the firm's problem may  be infeasible.6
In order to make this an interesting problem, we assume that the firm faces  a downward
sloping,  inverse  demand  function  for wood:  aPlay, < O. More  specifically,  in  the  nu-
merical  solution we will assume  that the inverse demand function is linear: Pi(t) = P, -
ai yi(t). In the  absence of extraction costs  and with  constant prices, the logger's  optimal
decision  when to  remove  all  commercially  interesting  trees would  simply be to  deplete
the mature  stock in the  first period  and benefit  from  the growth  potential  of secondary
forests  in all periods  that  follow. 7
6 Suppose  that the  terminal point of the  optimal extraction  path (y,(T))  and the starting  time  (t = 0)  are  specified.  Then,
at most 1 extraction  path will satisfy the conditions  that (a) ofTy,(t)dt =  X(O);  (b) y(t) > 0, V  t E [0, T]; and (c)  the necessary
nonarbitrage  condition  that describes  the development  of the costate variable over  time [see  equation (7)].  This path may be
optimal,  depending  on  the  discount  rate  applied by  the  firm,  but most  probably  it won't  be.  Changing  the  firm's  discount
rate  and evaluating  the effect  on deforestation  makes no  sense in this context.
7Note  that,  without loss,  a  so-called bang-bang  solution  can also  be avoided  when  we  model harvesting  costs explicitly
and assume  aC/ayi > 0.
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The equations  of motion of the model  will be explained  next.  With respect to  mature
forest,  the model is an extension  of the standard mining  model (Hotelling;  Dasgupta and
Heal):
(3)  xl(t)= -y(t),
where xl(t)  is the  stock of primary  forest in period  t,  measured  in hectares,  and yl(t)  is
the number  of hectares  of primary  forest that is  selectively  logged  in period  t.  The dot
over  a  variable  indicates  a  change  in time;  hence,  x  represents  a  change  in the  size  of
the stock.
In order to derive the specification of the second  equation of motion, we need to make
the  translation  from the  area of logged-over  primary  forest to  the quantity  of  commer-
cially  valuable  trees  in  secondary  forest.  Selectively  harvesting  the  stock  of primary
forest  implies  accumulating  a  stock  of secondary  forest. For  this  purpose  we  multiply
the  area harvested in  primary  forests  by a  conversion  factor  y.  The constant  is derived
as follows.  Assume  that the timber  volume  per hectare  of undisturbed  forests equals  qf
units of trees,  and  that it is  optimal for the firm to  restrict harvesting  to  qf 2 trees.  Now,
y  is given by  (t1r  - 2).  If the different age  classes  of trees  are homogenously  distributed
over the total  area,  /,  and  y will be constant.  Furthermore,  the  number of cubic meters
of commercially  valuable trees in secondary  forests falls over time because of harvesting
and  increases  over  time  because  of net  growth.  Hence,  the  equation  of motion of  sec-
ondary  forests is
(4)  x2(t)  =  yl(t) - y 2 (t)  +  g(x 2(t)).
In this equation x2(t)  is the stock  of timber in cubic meters  available in secondary  forest,
y2(t)  is the  number  of cubic  meters  of timber harvested,  and  g(x2)  describes  secondary
forest growth.  Invoking the maximum principle  and  assuming  an interior solution  gives
the  following necessary  conditions  for an optimal solution:
(5)  Pi(t  +  A(t)  =  A(),
(6)  P2(t)  = /(t),
;(t)
(7)  =  r,  and
A(t)
/L(t)
In  these  equations,  A(t)  and  A(t)  are  shadow  prices  (costate  variables)  associated  with
the  state  variables:  they  basically  reflect  how  much  the  logging  firm would  be willing
to  pay  for an extra  unit of primary  forest land  and  secondary  forest land, respectively.
The  interpretation  of  (5)  is  that  the  marginal  benefits  of  harvesting  a  unit  of primary
forest, measured  as the sum of direct revenues  and future  harvesting of secondary forest,
are  equal to the foregone  future timber  benefits from primary  forest. Equation  (6)  states
that marginal  timber  benefits  from  secondary  forest  should  equal  the  marginal  cost  of
foregone future  timber benefits.  Equations  (7) and (8)  are  nonarbitrage  conditions:  (7)  is
simply the Hotelling  rule,  and (8)  is an extended version of this rule that accommodates
the  growth  of the  resource.  After  substituting  the  solutions  of (7)  and  (8)  into  (5)  and
(6),  we  find
Bulte and van SoestJournal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
(9)  PI(t) - (PI +  yp2e(r-g')(Ti-T))er(  T1)  +  P2(t)  =  0,
and
(10)  P2 (t)  - P2e(r
- g )(t-T) =  0,
where Pi, i = 1,2 is the backstop  price for wood extracted  from forest type i, which will
be  reached  at  t  =  T 1 for  primary  forest  and  t  =  T for  secondary  forest,  because  by
definition at T 1 and T, respectively, primary  and secondary forest stocks must be depleted.
Harvesting  the stock of secondary  forest starts at time  T2. By  integrating  (3)  and (4) we
find




T  (^yyl(t)  - y2(t))e- g't dt = 0.
Jo
Solving this  model we  obtain the optimal depletion time of the primary forest T 1 and
the  starting period  of secondary  forest  extraction  T2 [See  appendix.  We  have  chosen a
linear  growth function  (g(x2)  = px2)  because  it facilitates  the mathematics  considerably
without affecting  the qualitative  results.] 8 Next,  the optimal depletion paths  for primary
and  secondary forests  can be derived.  The response  of T 1 to changes  in  r is the subject
of analysis in the next  section.  The discount rate r can change,  for instance,  because the
firm perceives  its tenure  security  differently as  time passes. There are  numerous reasons
why  (the perception  of)  tenure  security  may change  over  time.  For example,  the  firm
may fear that the  present political  elite loses  its dominant position,  through elections  or
a coup d'etat, and that the new government  will renege  on the contract  (for a discussion
and  empirical  study  of tenure  security,  see  Deacon).  Alternatively,  political  preferences
of the  government  may  be  subject  to  change  over  time.  This  latter  will  especially  be
important  if government  decision  making  is  in  accordance  with  public  choice  theories
(e.g.,  Mueller)  and not so  much aimed at achieving  a  socially  optimal solution.
If the  government  does  not  want  to  renegotiate  the  concession  contract  because  the
opportunity cost  of capital  has not changed  (hence, T is constant),  the firm will alter the
intertemporal  allocation of supply and redefine its optimal T 1 using the procedure outlined
above.9
Results
Given the  mathematical  results  as  presented  in  the appendix,  the effects  of an increase
in the rate  of discount  r on  the optimal  depletion time  of primary forests  T 1 and  on the
8 With  this specification,  even though g(x)  is a function  of y,  it is easily  verified  that g'(x) and y are independent  terms.
This is clearly  a violation  of standard  biological  relationships  central to selective  tree harvesting.  However,  since the focus
is  on  the transformation  of nongrowing  primary  forest  into growing  secondary  forest,  this simplification  is harmless.  It  is
recognised  that  the  present  model  specification  is not  suitable  to analyse,  for  instance,  optimal  thinning  in  the  secondary
forest.
9 In fact, the  model we  use does  not investigate  the impact of a change  in r after a few  years of harvesting but,  instead,
determines  optimal  exploitation paths from period 0  onwards.





Figure  1.  Optimal depletion  times  of  primary forests  and optimal starting times  of  logging  in
secondary forests,  for y  =  1.75 and y =  2.
Note:  Additional parameter values:  p = 0.05, x,(O)  =  550,  T =  50, Pi = 30, P 2 =  15,  a,  =  0.3,  a 2
= 0.15.
optimal  time at which  the  firm starts  logging  secondary  forests  T2 can be  derived.  The
model is complicated  and analytically solving it in order to illustrate the relation between
T,  and  r proves  to  be  extremely  cumbersome.  Therefore,  we resort  to  a numerical  so-
lution.  We  have  arbitrarily  selected  values  for  the  parameters  of  the  inverse  demand
functions and for x,(O) and T,  as reported in figure  1. Representative  results are presented
in  figure  1.
As is clear from this figure, the higher the rate of discount, the more logging in secondary
forests  is  postponed  while  the  effect  on  the  depletion  period  of  primary  forests  is  less
clearcut;  the  results  are  presented  for  two  different  values  of y  but  are  robust  for  other
parameter  values  (as  long  as the nonnegativity  constraints  are not violated). The fact that a
higher y leads  to lower optimal  values  of T, and T2 can  easily be explained  by analyzing
equation  (5).  Ceteris  paribus,  an  increase  in  y (which  may correspond  with  a high  initial
stocking  density)  will raise  the marginal  benefits  of primary forest exploitation because  the
investment  aspect  of harvesting,  hence the role  of converted  primary  forest  as an input  in
the  secondary  forest  production  process,  gains  weight.  In  order to  benefit  more  from  the
stock of secondary  forest, the concessionaire  wants to accelerate  access  to this stock. Hence,
the higher  the conversion factor y the shorter the optimal rotation of the primary forest,  and
logging in  secondary  forests  can start  at an earlier  date.
Second,  and more  important,  the  curve that  relates optimal  depletion to  the discount
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rate is not monotonically  declining but has  an inverted  U-shape.  This implies  that there
exists a range of r-values  for which raising the discount rate actually postpones depletion
of the primary  forest.  The reason  is that a high  discount rate  "tilts"  the price paths  and
optimal  exploitation  paths  of both  the  primary  and  the  secondary  forest  stock.  With
respect to the primary forest,  on the one hand,  this results is an incentive to harvest more
in  early  periods,  which is  the  standard Hotelling  result.  On the  other hand,  the shift in
the  price  path  of the  stock of secondary  wood  has  a  countervailing  effect  on  optimal
exploitation  of the virgin stock. The reason is as  follows.  Raising r while keeping T and
P2 fixed implies  that the new price path for secondary wood (P' 2 (t)) will be steeper and
necessarily  located  entirely  below  the  original  price  path.  If the  growth  rate  of  P2(t)
increases  and the  terminal  point is identical,  then automatically  the  starting point of the
price  path must be lower.  Hence,
(13)  li'(t) >  A(t) A g'(t) <  g(t),  vt E  [0,  r1.
The implications are  as  follows.  From (5)  it is clear that the low level of u(t) reduces
the  marginal  benefits  of converting  primary  forest into  a  productive  asset.  This  slows
down the optimal extraction rate of the stock of virgin forest, which explains the inverted
U-shaped  T.  path as  shown in  figure  1. Perhaps  this  explains  why empirical  support for
the hypothesis that high risk premiums  should accelerate  deforestation, provided by Dea-
con  (tables  4 and  5,  p.  424), is  weak.
From the inverse demand function we know that low realizations of /(t)  [which equals
P2(t)]  correspond  with a relatively  high  supply  of secondary  wood.  To satisfy condition
(12),  this means that T2 must be shifted to the future,  as the increase in supply per period
must  necessarily  be  compensated for by a reduction in the  number of periods  in  which
timber  is  actually  supplied.  Thus  supply  is increased  and prices  are  depressed,  but har-
vesting  the secondary  stock starts later.
Conclusions
It is well  documented  that high  discount rates  are detrimental  for natural  resource  con-
servation.  If  supply  is  restricted,  for instance  because  of a  tropical  timber  concession
contract, this general  conclusion no longer holds. If the concession period is exogenously
determined  and fixed  and  we recognize  that  depleting a  stock of primary  forest implies
building  a  stock of secondary  forest, then the effect  of high discount rates  on the  stock
of primary  forest is  ambiguous.  There  is a  range of r-values  over which  an increase  in
the  discount rate  actually  postpones  depletion.  In addition,  the  effect of higher discount
rates  on the  stock of secondary  forest is that the first period of exploitation  is shifted to
the  future  for all  r.  Whether  this  phenomenon  is likely  to  occur in  reality  depends  on
the strength  of the government  to enforce  concession contracts.
[Received November 1995; final version received July 1996.]
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Appendix
In order to determine  T, and T,, equations  (11)  and  (12)  must be solved.  First, we have
to determine the optimal paths of harvesting in primary  and secondary  forest areas. These
paths  can  be derived  by  inserting  the  inverse  demand  functions  into equations  (9)  and
(10),  and then solving  them for yl(t) and y2(t):
(A1)  yl(t)  =-[P 1 - [Pi  +  pYP 2e(r  -)(T  -T)]er(t -T)  + yP 2e(r  p)(tT)],
Otl
and
(A2)  Y2(t)  =  -[P 2 - P2e(
r -P )(t-T)]
0L2
Now the integrals  (11)  and  (12)  can  be derived  using  the optimal  depletion paths  (Al)
and  (A2).  The result  for equation  (11)  is
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- 1  - - vP2
e - (r 
- )T
(A3)  (a,x,(O)=P,T,  -- [P, + yP 2e(r-)(T-T)][1 - e-rT] +  [er-p)T - e(r-p)T 2]
r  (r-  p)
The result for equation  (12)  is
(A4)  aP  (  2 - - (e(r-p)r - e-(r-2p)T2)
t2Y  P  r-2p
P  yP 2e -(r-P)T
=  -(1  - e
- pTl)  +  P  2  e--  [e(r-2p)TI  - e(r-2p)T2]
p  r - 2p
e-rTI
- [P  +  P2e(r-p)("-T)]  [e
( r - p)T  - 1]
and  T  are  determined  simultaneously  by these two equations.
T1 and  T2 are  determined  simultaneously  by these two equations.